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 Moorean absurdity and conscious belief*
1.  Introduction 
 
G. E. Moore observed that to for me to assert, “I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I 
don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd” (1942: 543). Over half a century later, the 
explanation of the nature of this absurdity remains problematic. Such assertions are 
unlike semantically odd Liar-type assertions such as “What I’m now saying is not true” 
since my Moorean assertion might be true: you may consistently imagine a situation in 
which I went to the pictures last Tuesday but fail to believe that I did.  Moreover, if you 
contradict my assertion then your words, “If he went to the pictures last Tuesday then he 
believes he did” do not express a necessary truth .1   Nonetheless it remains absurd of me 
to assert that p and I don’t believe that p.  It seems no less absurd of me to silently judge 
that p and I don’t believe that p2.  But why should it be absurd of me to assert something 
that might be true of me?  Why should it be absurd of me to believe something that might 
be true of me?   
In §2 I argue that any satisfactory answer to these questions should acknowledge 
four constraints on the answers to these two questions.  Firstly, there is an important 
connection between the answer to the first question and that to the second. Secondly, any 
satisfactory account should explain the absurdity not just of beliefs or assertions of the 
‘omissive’ form, p & I don’t believe that p, but also of those of the ‘comissive’ form, p & 
I believe that not-p as well. Thirdly, the explanation of Moorean absurdity should 
generalise to other example that intuitively share the paradigmatic absurdity of Moore’s 
two examples.  Fourthly, while most explanations in the literature of the absurdity of 
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 Moorean belief proceed in terms of a pair of contradictory beliefs there is reason to think 
that the explanation would proceed better in terms of a single self-contradictory belief.   
An account of conscious Moorean belief promises to deliver this improved 
account.  The distinction between holding a pair of contradictory beliefs and holding a 
single self-contradictory belief holds only if belief fails to collect over conjunction. I 
argue for that failure in §3. In §4 I briefly examine some key features of conscious belief, 
notably that in holding a belief consciously, one is aware of oneself.  In §5 I expound 
David Rosenthal’s account of conscious belief and show that it fails to capture this key 
feature, as well as being vulnerable to other objections.  In §6 I show that Rosenthal’s 
account fails to explain the absurdity of Moorean belief.  In §7 I show that Sidney 
Shoemaker account of the absurdity of Moorean belief also fails.  Although each of these 
accounts is problematic in its own way, both suffer from the inability to deliver the 
account of the absurdity in terms of self-contradictory belief.  However there is another 
way of explaining the absurdity of Moorean belief in terms of self-contradictory belief.  
This is a consequence of Brentano’s general account of self-awareness of mental states. 
In §8 I sketch his account for belief.  In §9 and §10 I show how it gives a simple 
explanation of the absurdity of Moorean belief that extends to other beliefs that are 
paradigmatically Moorean.  In §11 I show how the account explains how awareness of 
my beliefs helps me change my mind for the better.  Finally I show in  §12 how the 
account also helps deepen the explanation of the absurdity of Moorean assertion.   
2.  Four constraints on solution. 
There is a recent tradition3 of attempting to deliver the explanation of the absurdity of 
Moorean assertion in terms of Moorean belief4.  For example, Shoemaker (1995 note 1, 
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 p.227), observes that “What can be coherently believed constrains what can be coherently 
asserted but not conversely”5. But since ‘coherently’ is ambiguous between 
‘consistently’, ‘appropriately’ and ‘rationally’ then the principle best stick with Moore’s 
own term ‘absurdly’, by which he means ‘irrationally, either in theory or practice’.  This 
yields: 
If I cannot non-absurdly believe that p then I cannot non-absurdly assert that p  
 
The failure of the converse of this is supported by the fact that my utterance “I’m 
asserting nothing now”, is unlike Moore’s example6.  After all, I could quietly believe in 
or acknowledge my continuing obedience to a Trappist vow of silence without the least 
absurdity.  Given this constraint it seems sensible to first give an account of the account 
of the absurdity of Moorean belief and then account for the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion.   
 Secondly, an important fact still often overlooked in the debate is that Moore also 
observes that to say, “I believe that he has gone out, but he has not” would be likewise 
“absurd” (1944, p.204).  Unlike Moore’s first example, which has the omissive form p & 
I don’t believe that p, this has the comissive7 form, p & I believe that not-p8.  This 
semantic difference is inherited from the genuine difference between atheists and 
agnostics9. The result is the difference between the commission of a mistake in belief and 
the omission of true belief.  So the explanation of Moorean absurdity had better explain 
both forms, both in assertion and in belief10.   
Thirdly, there is a class of propositions that intuitively share the paradigmatic 
absurdity of Moore’s examples.  These include the non-conjunctive, I have no beliefs 
now as well as the non-first person God knows that I am not a theist and the comissive 
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 God knows that I am an atheist11.  If these propositions really do share the essential 
features of Moore’s two examples, then any account of Moorean absurdity should 
generalise to assertions and beliefs of them as well.  
Most who hear a Moorean assertion diagnose contradiction, even after the 
admission that the words of the assertion might be true.  Some go on to claim that the 
speaker may have contradicted himself without asserting a contradiction. Most 
explanations in the literature of the absurdity of Moorean belief proceed in terms of a pair 
of contradictory beliefs12, namely those that contradict each other.   
 For example, in addressing only the comissive belief, Jane Heal (1994, pp.21-22) 
plausibly assumes that belief distributes over conjunction.  Then if I believe that (p and I 
believe that not-p) then I believe that p and I believe that not-p.  Heal also endorses the 
more controversial principle of belief-elimination,  
 If I believe that I believe that p then I believe that p.   
So I believe that p and I believe that not-p13.  
 My previous account (xxxxx) likewise proceeds in terms of a pair of contradictory 
beliefs. Assuming only that belief distributes over conjunction, my forming the belief that 
p and I don’t believe that p falsifies its second conjunct.  So although I may form that 
belief and although what I believe might be true, it cannot be true if I believe it14.  When 
my belief is comissive this result is avoided only if I hold contradictory beliefs about 
whether p15.  This is something I’m in a position to work out (as we just did) on minimal 
reflection16.   
 A self-falsifying belief is as useless as a guide to the truth as a pair of 
contradictory beliefs. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me in coming to believe the 
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 omissive proposition would justify me in believing what is then false. Likewise any 
evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and 
conversely.  So if I don’t revise my beliefs after that recognition then I’m absurd in the 
sense that I’m theoretically irrational.  Nonetheless the two irrationalities are distinct, as 
we should expect from the clear difference between a specific lack if true belief and a 
specific instance of mistaken belief.  
 But De Almeida raises the worry (2001, p.43) that a diagnosis in terms of a pair of 
contradictory beliefs might not do justice to the pathology of Moorean belief.  This seems 
correct, for we can consistently suppose that I have contradictory beliefs because one or 
other of them is unconscious.  A visit to a psychiatrist might unearth my long-repressed 
belief that my mother was an adulterer that persists in the face of my sincere adult 
assertion that she was not. In that case my irrationality seems milder than the pathology 
of Moorean belief.   
 So fourthly, a more satisfying diagnosis would proceed, not in terms of my 
holding a pair of contradictory beliefs, as when I believe that p and I believe that not-p 
but rather in terms of my single belief in a self-contradiction, as when I believe that both 
p and not-p. What underpins this distinction is the failure of belief to collect over 
conjunction, in other words the failure of the principle 
 If I believe that p and I believe that q then I believe that (p and q) 
This failure likewise underpins the difference between believing a self-contradiction and 
holding a set of inconsistent beliefs, as when I believe that p and I believe that q and I 
believe that not-(p and q). This tripartite distinction is the difference between holding a 
set of beliefs that cannot all be true, holding beliefs that contradict each other and holding 
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 a belief that contradicts itself17.   
3. The failure of belief to collect over conjunction  
There are reasons why belief fails to collect over conjunction.  To say that I hold a belief 
of which I am conscious is just to say that I hold a belief of which I am aware. But of the 
many beliefs I now hold, I may hold a belief that p and hold a belief that q without having 
considered the conjunction p & q, especially if I am unaware of holding one or both of 
these beliefs.  In such a case I may fail to be aware that I believe that both p and q.   
Moreover, I surely cannot I cannot think the fat thought that conjoins the content of all 
the beliefs that I hold, consciously and unconsciously, about the world, at least not in a 
way that makes me aware of that thought. So in that case I do not hold a conscious belief 
of the conjunction of what I believe.  What explains this inability is the conjecture that  
 My belief that p requires my ability to think the occurrent thought that p  
This required ability of thought explains why although we may intuitively suppose that a 
dog has rudimentary beliefs about the food in its bowl (which helps us explain its 
behaviour as it strains at its leash), we hesitate to attribute to it the belief that it will be 
beaten in Lent. Clearly it does not have the concept of Lent and so lacks the ability to 
think thoughts of Lent. Nor does it have our sophisticated concepts of belief or selfhood. 
 The requirement also explains our difficulty in characterizing the beliefs of other 
species in any fine-grained way, since it is difficult to specify, using the linguistic 
expressions of our thoughts, exactly what concepts (or derivatively, thoughts) are 
available to those with radically different linguistic capacities and ways of behaving.  
 Admittedly, the required ability of thought is challenged by the fact that in one 
sense I can believe things on authority that I do not understand. For example, I may 
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 believe an authority on physics that assures me that entropy is increasing although I have 
no idea what entropy is. But believing that she has said something true is different from 
believing what she says. Although I don’t believe that entropy is increasing, I do believe 
that she has said something true (although I don’t know what) since although I cannot 
think thoughts of entropy, I can think the thought that by using the word ‘entropy’, she 
has said something true.18.   
 Granted this, I may be unable to think the occurrent thought of the fat conjunction 
of all of my present beliefs although I have the ability to think the thought of each of my 
present belief separately.  One reason for my inability may be not that I lack the relevant 
concepts needed to think the would-be thought, but rather because it is just too complex 
for me to think.  But in such a case I could not even hold an unconscious belief of the 
conjunction of everything I now believe. 
 A final reason why belief does not collect over conjunction is given by the 
following possibility.  Suppose that I know a priori that it is false that p and not-p yet 
continue to separately believe that p and believe that not-p, because one or both of these 
beliefs is unconscious. Were belief to collect over conjunction, I would know what I 
believe to be false.  But there is reason to rule this out.  For it is now uncontroversial that 
 If I know that p then I believe that p 
But having accepted this we should also accept  
 If I know that p then I don’t believe that not-p 
Otherwise we would have to accept the possibility that I know what I hold contradictory 
beliefs about.  But such ‘knowledge’ would hardly be conducive to finding the truth. 
 On the other hand it is highly plausible to think that it is part of the essential 
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 nature of belief to distribute over conjunction:   
 If I believe that both p and q then I believe that p and I believe that q 
In believing that today is hot and humid, surely I must believe that today is hot and 
believe that today is humid.  If this principle is essentially true then it’s use prejudges no 
question of irrationality.  
 So since belief distributes but does not collect over conjunction, if I hold a self-
contradictory belief then I hold contradictory beliefs but not conversely.  And if I hold 
contradictory beliefs I hold a set of inconsistent beliefs but not conversely.      
Self-contradictory beliefs are less conducive to truth than pairs of contradictory 
beliefs.  When I hold contradictory beliefs half of my beliefs are bound to be true. But 
when I hold a self-contradictory belief then all my beliefs are bound to be false.   
4. Features of conscious belief  
Suppose that I have been sitting at my desk next to the window. Although I am only 
peripherally aware of the weather, I am aware of it enough to unconsciously register 
changes of rainfall.  I could probably recall the onset of rain, although I have yet to be 
aware of any changes in my recent beliefs about rain.  Other unconscious beliefs include 
prejudices that I sincerely but mistakenly deny holding.  Since I don’t suddenly pass into 
total ignorance by falling into a dreamless sleep, they also include beliefs that I hold 
when dreamlessly asleep.  By contrast, suppose that I arrive at my desk and peer out of 
the window in search of fine weather.  My disappointment at discovering rain might go 
hand in hand with my awareness that I think it’s raining. 
 It is not my aim to produce a full account of conscious belief.  Doing so would 
have to elucidate the quality or what-is-it-like-ness of awareness. But although my 
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 awareness of my own beliefs may have a non-sensory quality, an explanation of the 
absurdity of Moorean belief does not require us to elucidate this.  Nonetheless there are 
features of conscious belief that we should note.   
Firstly, I have so far used ‘conscious’ as a synonym of ‘aware’.  This seems 
unobjectionable.  Where N is a noun, surely I’m conscious of having an N just in case 
I’m aware of having an N.  To say that I am conscious of a belief, fear, suspicion or 
toothache is just to say that I am aware of having it.  Secondly, we should all agree that 
‘aware’ is factive in the sense in which “I’m aware of a toothache I don’t have” reports a 
self-contradiction.  So I cannot be aware of holding a belief unless I really do hold it. One 
central way in which I may be aware of a toothache is to know or believe I have it.  
Thirdly, we should distinguish the question of whether a belief is conscious from the 
question of whether it is occurrent.   An occurrent belief is one that has just occurred in 
me.  Likewise an occurrent awareness is an awareness that has just occurred in me. So to 
say that I am aware of a belief is neutral on the question of whether I have just formed 
that belief or whether I have just become aware of holding it. Fourthly, in becoming 
aware of holding a belief surely I not only become aware of that belief itself but also 
become aware of myself holding it19.   
5. Rosenthal’s account of conscious belief. 
 
One insightful attempt to analyse conscious belief that attempts to capture this fourth 
feature is Rosenthal’s account.  According to Rosenthal (1997) I am conscious of my 
belief that p just in case I have a suitable thought about that belief.  Since my supposition 
that I hold a belief would not make me aware of a belief that I really do hold, the suitable 
higher-order thought in question had best be a belief.  Rosenthal observes (1997,  p.471) 
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 that this higher-order occurrent belief is ‘suitable’ only if it represents not only the 
occurrence of that belief, but also represents myself as myself in that state of belief. 
Consistently with this, Rosenthal holds a higher order principle of conscious belief  
If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I believe that I myself 
believe that p. 
 
This seems correct. For if I were to believe that X now believes that it is raining then this 
wouldn’t capture my awareness of my own belief. I might not realise that I am X but 
have in mind someone else. Rosenthal adds that the second-order belief must be formed 
at roughly the same time as the first.  This also seems plausible.  For if I acquire the 
conscious belief that it is raining as I peer out of the window in search of dry weather, 
then I acquire the belief that I belief that I believe that it is raining more or less as I come 
to believe that it is raining.   Rosenthal further adds that the second-order belief must be 
formed non-observationally and non-inferentially.  This seems correct as well.  Although 
my observation of rain plays a part in the causal history of belief that it is raining, it is not 
what licenses my belief that I hold this belief.  Nor is that second order belief a result of 
ghostly observation of, or inference from, the first.  As Wittgenstein points out, to decide 
whether I believe that p all I normally have to do is to look to the outside world and 
decide whether p (1980, §488, §501).   
But Rosenthal’s higher order principle of conscious belief fails to capture the fact 
of my self-awareness. To see this, let us represent Rosenthal’s principle diagrammatically 
(where the thick arrows depict the direction of representation) as a model of conscious 
belief (in this case that it is raining): 
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 Figure 1: Rosenthal’s Higher-Order Model of Conscious Belief 
 
 
                I am now aware that I believe that it is raining  
 
 
    
 
 
                                  I believe that it is raining  
 
 
 
 
                                                 Rain 
 
The idea of representation is in turn cashed out in terms of the content of my beliefs.  My 
first-order belief represents the state of rain because its content includes a description of 
that state.  For the same reason my second-order belief represents my first order belief. 
On this model what makes my first-order belief involve self-awareness is an extrinsic 
property of it, namely that it is represented by my second-order belief.  That second-order 
belief is itself not conscious, for to me to be aware of it would be for me to have a third-
order belief that represents it.  
Many have objected to the claim that a mental state is conscious in virtue of being 
accompanied by a separate higher-order thought20. These critics make two main 
objections both of which try to show that the higher-order model does not guarantee self-
awareness. The first objection (see Goldman 1993, Rey 1988) notes that my awareness of 
my first-order belief is not intrinsic to that belief. But if neither belief is intrinsically 
conscious then it is possible that there is a zombie who holds both beliefs but has no self-
awareness at all.  The second objection (see Kriegel 2002) observes that my second-order 
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 belief, in virtue of which I’m aware of my first-order belief, may itself be a belief of 
which I’m unaware.  So the fact that my second-order belief represents myself does not 
mean that by holding it, I am aware of myself.   
Thirdly, the phenomenology of my conscious states appears to be unitary and 
cohesive, admitting no internal division into distinct occurrent states.  As I become aware 
of my belief that it is raining, it does not seem to me that I have separate thoughts. 
6.  The failure of Rosenthal’s account to explain the absurdity of Moorean belief 
Most importantly, Rosenthal’s higher order principle of conscious belief is not 
enough to provide an adequate explanation of the absurdity of Moorean belief.  This is 
shown by Thomas Baldwin’s (1990, p.230) account of the absurdity, one that implicitly 
anticipates Rosenthal’s principle. Baldwin argues that  
…A rational thinker will not consciously hold a Moorean belief. For to hold a belief consciously is 
both to hold the belief and be aware, and thus believe, that one holds it; and no rational thinker 
will believe either that he both believes and fails to believe the same thing (which is required by a 
conscious belief that p and that one does not believe that p) or that he both believes and 
disbelieves the same thing (which is required by conscious belief that p and that one believes that 
not-p). 
 
But in the omissive case, if I consciously believe that (p and I don’t believe that p) then 
Rosenthal’s higher order principle means that I believe that (p and I don’t believe that p) 
and also hold the belief that I believe that (p and I don’t believe that p).  But clearly some 
other principle is needed as well in order to derive my single belief that I both do and 
don’t believe that p. One such principle is that higher-order belief distributes over 
conjunction: 
If I believe that I believe that (p and q) then I believe that I believe that p and I 
believe that I believe that q.   
 
Once we admit this plausible principle, then since I believe that I believe that (p and I 
don’t believe that p) it follows that I believe that I do believe that p.  And since I also 
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 hold the first order belief that (p and I don’t believe that p) then since belief per se 
distributes over conjunction then I believe that I don’t believe that p21.  In the comissive 
case the same line of reasoning yields the result that I believe that I believe that p and 
also I believe that I believe that not-p22.  
We can arrive at the same result by replacing the principle that higher-order belief 
distributes over conjunction by the equally plausible principle that conscious belief 
distributes over conjunction:  
If I consciously believe that (p and q) then I consciously believe that p and I 
consciously believe that q.   
 
In the omissive case, if I consciously believe that (p and I don’t believe that p) then I 
consciously believe that p. So given the higher-order principle of conscious belief, I 
believe that I believe that p.  But I also consciously believe that I don’t believe that p, so 
by the higher-order principle of conscious belief again, I believe that I don’t believe that 
p23.  In the comissive case, parallel reasoning delivers the result that I believe that I 
believe that p and also I believe that I believe that not-p24.   
But this result does not fit Baldwin’s description in the omissive case of my single 
belief that I both do and don’t believe that p.  Nor does it fit his description in the 
omissive case of my single belief that I both believe and disbelieve that p.   
Moreover, on Rosenthal’s higher order principle of conscious belief, the higher-
order belief is unconscious.  Indeed Rosenthal cannot modify his principle as  
If I consciously believe that p then I believe that p and I consciously believe that I 
believe that p.   
 
For on Rosenthal’s account my second-order belief is a thought that occurs to me just 
after I have formed the thought that constitutes my first-order belief. So the modification 
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 would saddle us with an infinite succession of discrete mental performances that nobody, 
not even the most rational among us, could complete. This means that when we appeal to 
the principle that higher-order belief distributes over conjunction, we must apply it to my 
unconscious higher-order belief.  This will only yield an unconscious belief.  And when 
we appeal to the principle that conscious belief distributes over conjunction, we must 
apply it twice to obtain a pair of higher-order beliefs, both of which must be unconscious.  
So on either strategy, the absurdity of my Moorean belief must be analysed in terms of a 
pair of contradictory beliefs, one or both of which I hold unconsciously.   
But we have already seen that this fails to do justice to the pathology of Moorean 
belief.  A deeper diagnosis would analyse the madness in terms of a single self-
contradictory belief. 
7. Shoemaker’s account of Moorean belief 
Shoemaker’s attempt to explain the absurdity of Moorean belief in terms of a single self-
contradictory belief also fails.  He writes (1995, p.213): 
…consider the proposition…expressed by the sentence “It is raining and I don’t believe that it is 
raining, and that this is so (viz., that it is raining and I don’t believe that it is) is something I believe.” 
That is self-contradictory. 
 
In other words, Shoemaker observes that it is self-contradictory to suppose that I hold an 
omissive Moorean proposition that is not mistaken.  This is perfectly true.  As we have 
already noted, such a belief is self-falsifying, given that belief distributes over 
conjunction.  But this diagnosis does not hold for the comissive Moorean belief.  For I 
may correctly believe that p and I believe that not-p, provided I hold contradictory beliefs 
about whether p.  Moreover seems to be no self-contradiction in supposing that I do so.  
Shoemaker continues (1995, p.213): 
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 So it is a feature of the contents of Moore paradoxical sentences that if they can be believed at all, the 
subject of such a belief could not believe that she had it without believing a contradiction.  
 
But this fails to follow. In the omissive case, the belief that I think I hold is self-
falsifying.  In the comissive case, the belief that I think I hold is self-falsifying unless I 
hold contradictory beliefs.  In neither case it is obvious that I must hold contradictory 
beliefs, let alone believe a self-contradiction.   
So what else will deliver a self-contradictory belief?  Shoemaker’s answer appears to 
be a principle of rational belief introduction (1995, p.214, my italics) that 
... believing something commits one to believing that one believes it, in the sense that in some kind of 
circumstances, yet to be specified, if one believes something, and considers whether one does, one 
must, on pain of irrationality, believe that one believes it.  
 
Since the normal circumstances Shoemaker has in mind exclude, for instance, bouts of 
temporary amnesia, the principle may be clarified as  
Normally, if I believe that p then I would believe that I believe that p were I to 
consider whether I believe that p. 
 
where this is supposed to hold true of me if I am maximally rational.  This principle 
seems entirely plausible.  Moreover it has the advantage of avoiding an infinite regress, 
since there are only a finite number of acts of considering.  
How will this principle help explain the absurdity of Moorean belief?  Suppose in 
the omissive case, that I rationally believe that p and I don’t believe that p.  To get any 
further Shoemaker needs the plausible principle that rational belief distributes over 
conjunction: 
If I rationally believe that p and q then I rationally believe that p and I rationally 
believe that q.  
 
So I rationally believe that p and I rationally believe that I don’t believe that p.  Now 
Shoemaker’s principle of rational belief introduction may be applied to the first of my 
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 rational beliefs.  But what this principle really means is that if I rationally believe that p 
then at best, I unconsciously believe that I believe that p until I perform the act of 
consideration, or in other words of reflection, on the question of whether I believe that p.  
So Shoemaker’s principle will yield only the result that I unconsciously believe that I 
believe that p yet also believe that I don’t believe that p.  In the comissive case, parallel 
reasoning delivers the result that if I rationally believe that p and I believe that not-p then 
I unconsciously believe that I believe that p yet also believe that I believe that not-p. But 
we have already seen that such a diagnosis in terms a pair of contradictory beliefs is 
inadequate, especially one at least one of the pair is unconscious. 
The second problem with Shoemaker’s position is that he explains the absurdity 
of Moorean belief in terms of the truth of his principle of rational belief introduction. I 
fail Shoemaker’s principle just in case I believe that p but I don’t believe that I believe 
that p.  If we now substitute q for I believe that p, this becomes an omissive case in which 
q but I don’t believe that q. Self-deception seems to show such that such a case is 
possible.  For example, my assertion that I don’t believe that women are inferior may be 
sincere because I am blind to the way I treat them. But you may be in a better position to 
recognise that my boorish behaviour is the manifestation of the existing belief that I 
sincerely deny having.  In other words 
I believe that women are inferior but I don’t think I believe they are   
Now suppose that I acquire the true belief that this is so.  I now have an omissive 
Moorean belief the absurdity of which cannot be explained in terms of the truth of 
Shoemaker’s principle.  
 16
 Nor could Shoemaker adequately explain the absurdity in terms of the falsehood 
of his principle.  For although my inability to recognise my own prejudiced conviction 
that women are inferior makes me irrational, it is hardly the deeper irrationality of 
Moorean belief.    
So despite the fact that different problems afflict Rosenthal and Shoemaker’s 
accounts, both fail to explain the absurdity of Moorean belief in terms of a single self-
contradictory belief. On Rosenthal’s account, the root cause of this problem is the higher 
order theory that separates my higher order belief into a separate thought from my 
original belief.  On Shoemaker’s account the root cause is the principle that rational 
belief distributes over conjunction.  Once we have separated my beliefs in this way, it is 
difficult to see how they can be recombined into a single unitary thought, especially since 
we have reason to think that belief per se does not collect over conjunction.  
However there is an alternative account of Moorean absurdity that does justice to 
the pathology of Moorean belief and assertion in terms of conscious belief.  This is a 
consequence of Brentano’s general account of self-awareness of mental states. 
8. Brentano’s account of conscious belief 
According to Brentano (1874, Chapters 1-2), it is a distinctive property of all conscious 
mental states, including beliefs, that they include within them an implicit awareness of 
themselves (1874, pp.127-8).  In other words, in being aware of my beliefs I am aware, 
among other things, of myself. More specifically, Brentano’s principle of conscious 
belief is that  
I consciously believe that p just in case I believe that (p and I myself believe that p). 
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 Since belief distributes but does not collect over conjunction, this principle is stronger 
than Rosenthal’s higher order principle of conscious belief because it entails but is not 
entailed by it25. Moreover it differs from Rosenthal’s principle, according to which every 
conscious belief is accompanied by a separate belief about it.  An equivalent way of 
putting Brentano’s principle is that whenever I consciously believe that p then I believe 
that I believe truly that p.  In forming the belief that it is raining being aware that I do so 
believe that it is raining, I take myself to hold the true belief that it is falling at me. This 
is consistent with Wittgenstein’s observation (1980, §490) that in considering what I 
believe about the world, I cannot hold apart my conception of the world from how I take 
the world to be. 
We may also represent Brentano’s principle diagrammatically:  
 
Figure 2: Brentano’s Model of Conscious Belief 
 
 
         
     
 
I believe that (it is raining and I believe that it is raining)  
 
 
 
 
 
              Rain        Myself in a state of belief 
 
 
My belief represents the state of rain because its content includes a description of that 
state of affairs.  It also represents myself, because its content includes a description of 
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 myself in a state of belief.   The large arrow seems to depict my belief representing itself.  
But as an inspection of parentheses shows, this is only partly true. Rather that belief 
represents part, although not all, of itself.  Its content includes a description of my belief 
that it is raining.  Since belief distributes over conjunction, this is part of what I believe in 
thinking that I believe truly that it is raining.  But its content does not include a 
description of my belief that I believe that it is raining, which is also part of what I 
believe. On this account, my conscious belief that it is raining not only represents the 
state of rain but also represents my belief that this is so and in so doing represents myself 
in that state of belief. Thus in partly representing itself, my conscious belief represents 
myself and the world as well, in one unified moment of thought.   
Brentano’s principle explains our intuition that generally, animals are incapable of 
holding conscious beliefs.  For that principle requires a belief about the self as well as a 
belief about belief.  Given that most animals do not possess such sophisticated concepts, 
then the truth of the conjecture that a subject’s belief that p requires the subject be able to 
think the thought that p, prohibits most animals from forming such beliefs.    
Brentano’s account also avoids the three objections against Rosenthal’s higher-
order model.  Firstly, a conscious belief is a belief in which I’m aware of myself in virtue 
of that belief partly representing itself.  This avoids the zombie objection.  Secondly, the 
belief that represents myself is a belief of which I’m aware, which avoids the second 
objection.  Finally my conscious belief is a single unified thought, which accords with the 
phenomenology of that belief. In consciously believing that it is raining I think the single 
thought that I believe truly that it is raining.   
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 9.  Applying Brentano’s account to Moorean belief 
Brentano’s principle provides a simple explanation of the absurdity of conscious 
Moorean belief.  In the omissive case, suppose that I consciously believe that (p and I 
don’t believe that p).  Then by Brentano’s principle  
I believe that [(p and I don’t believe that p) and I believe that (p and I don’t 
believe that p)].  
 
The first conjunct of what I believe is true only if I don’t believe that p.  But since belief 
distributes over conjunction, the second conjunct of what I believe is true only if I do 
believe that p.  So what I believe is self-contradictory or necessarily false26. 
In the comissive case suppose that I consciously believe that (p and I believe that 
not-p).  Then by Brentano’s principle  
I believe that [(p and I believe that not-p) and I believe that (p and I believe that 
not-p)].  
 
The first conjunct of what I believe is true only if I believe that not-p.  But since belief 
distributes over conjunction, the second conjunct of what I believe is true only if I believe 
that p.  So what I believe is true only if I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p27.   
This last result is stronger than that provided by my original account.  On the 
original account, when I come to believe that (p and I believe that not-p) this act of belief 
falsifies the content of that belief unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.  
Nonetheless that I mistakenly believe that p (which is what I believe) might be true 
whether or not I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p.  But on Brentano’s account 
of conscious belief, if I consciously believe that (p and I believe that not-p) then the full 
content of that belief cannot be true unless I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p. 
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 The prime virtue of this account is that it at last gives a deep enough diagnosis of 
the pathology of Moorean belief.  It also has the second advantage of preserving the 
structural difference between the two irrationalities. When my omissive belief is 
conscious then I believe a self-contradiction.  When my comissive belief is conscious it is 
true only if I hold a pair of contradictory beliefs.  Given the semantic difference between 
an omission of knowledge and the commission of a mistake in belief, this structural 
difference is what we should expect. 
10. Extending Brentano’s account to other Moorean beliefs 
This account is supported by the fact that it easily extends to other beliefs that are 
paradigmatically Moorean.  These include beliefs that I have no beliefs now and God 
knows that I am not a theist.  Like the content of Moore’s omissive example, these 
possible truths report no irrationality in me.  Rather they report only my global ignorance 
in the first case and my ignorance of the existence of God in the second.  Nonetheless my 
belief of either is self-falsifying.  Comissive Moorean beliefs include the belief that God 
knows that I am an atheist.  This possible truth only reports my mistaken belief in the 
non-existence of God.  Nonetheless my belief in it escapes self-falsification only if I hold 
contradictory beliefs about the existence of God.   
Suppose that I now consciously believe that I have no beliefs now.  Then on 
Brentano’s principle, I now believe that (I have no beliefs now and I now believe that I 
have now beliefs now).  In other words I now believe that (I have no beliefs now and I 
now have a belief, namely that I have now beliefs now).  Therefore I hold a self-
contradictory belief.  
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 The same result obtains if I consciously believe that God knows that I am not a 
theist.  For by Brentano’s principle, I believe that (God knows that I am not a theist and I 
believe that God knows that I am not a theist).  If the first conjunct of what I believe is 
true then since knowledge is factive, I don’t believe that God exists.  But if the second 
conjunct of what I believe is true then I do believe that God exists.  So what I believe is 
again a semantic self-contradiction. 
We should expect a different result in the comissive case in which I consciously 
believe that God knows that I am an atheist.  By Brentano’s principle, this means that I 
believe that (God knows that I am an atheist and I believe that God knows that I am an 
atheist).  If the first conjunct of what I believe is true then since knowledge is factive, I 
believe that God does not exist.  But if the second conjunct of what I believe is true then I 
do believe that God exists.  So in effect, I believe myself to hold contradictory beliefs 
about the existence of God. 
11. Changing my mind 
There may be such a thing as unconscious Moorean belief.  If so, then my original 
account accounts for its irrationality.  It is one thing to say that I should minimally reflect 
upon my Moorean belief in a way that will reveal it to be self-falsifying on pain of 
contradictory beliefs.  It is another to say I actually do so.  
On the other hand, if I do become aware of my Moorean belief then this moment 
of epiphany is a valuable insight into my own pathology, one that represents an 
opportunity for changing my mind for the better.  This is one important way in which a 
higher-order belief may cause different behaviour from the belief it is about28.  So in what 
way should I change my mind? 
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 Suppose that it is a fact that (p and I don’t believe that p).  This impugns my 
knowledge but not my rationality.  I am merely ignorant of the truth that p.  Now suppose 
that I come to believe that (p and I don’t believe that p).  Since belief distributes over 
conjunction, the second conjunct of what I believe becomes false. If I am aware of what I 
believe and am at all rational I will realize this and will accordingly give up my incorrect 
belief that I don’t believe that p.  So if my belief that (p and I don’t believe that p) is 
conscious, then it is part of a useful recognition of my own specific ignorance, one that is 
rationally and quickly replaced by true belief.  On the other hand if that recognition leads 
me to no epistemic revision, then I am indeed irrational.  For then I believe in effect that I 
am ignorant of the truth that p, yet mistakenly think that I don’t accept that truth.    
A similar revision of belief will be triggered by my conscious belief in the 
comissive case.  Suppose that it is a fact that (p and I believe that not-p).  This impugns 
my infallibility but not my rationality.  Now suppose that I come to believe that (p and I 
believe that not-p).  Since belief distributes over conjunction, I now hold contradictory 
beliefs.  If I am aware of what I believe and am at all rational I will realize this and will 
accordingly give up one of both of these beliefs, either by re-examining the evidence for 
or against believing that p or by suspending judgment about whether p.  So if my belief 
that (p and I believe that not-p) is conscious, then it is part of a useful recognition of my 
own specific mistake, one that is rationally and quickly expunged.  On the other hand if 
that recognition leads me to no epistemic revision, then I am indeed irrational.  For then I 
realise that I hold contradictory beliefs yet continue to hold them. Such a case might 
occur when exasperated by a particularly obtuse psychiatrist who keeps reassuring me 
that my belief that I’m the victim of persecution is just a delusion, I remark, “Look, I 
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 bloody well know that people aren’t persecuting me, but I just can’t help believing that 
they are!” 
12.  Applying Brentano’s account to Moorean assertion 
Brentano’s account of conscious belief also helps deepen the explanation of the absurdity 
of Moorean assertion.  With few harmless exceptions, when I make an assertion to you I 
intend to make you believe me, in other words, to believe that I’m sincerely telling the 
truth.  But when my assertion is Moorean then I should see with minimal reflection that 
you wouldn’t believe me .  29
When I let you know that p, I fulfil my main intention of imparting my knowledge 
to you.  But when I tell you the lie that p I attempt to make you mistakenly believe that p.  
In either case I intend to get you to believe my words. But I cannot succeed in this 
attempt unless I also get you to think that I am sincere in making the assertion.  For if you 
think that I’m play-acting or recognise that I’m lying then you have no reason to accept 
my words, so my attempt to impart knowledge or lie to you will fail. Since I should see 
with minimal reflection that this is so, my full intention must be to get you to believe my 
words by getting you to think me sincere in uttering them30.  In other words, I aim to 
make you believe me in the sense of making you think I’m sincerely telling the truth.31    
Suppose that you now believe me when I assert to you that p and I don’t believe 
that p.  This means that you now believe me to be sincerely telling the truth.  So you must 
now think that I believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me sincere) and you must now, 
in the same instant, believe that I don’t believe that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be 
telling the truth).  Moreover, these two beliefs you have just acquired can hardly be 
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 beliefs of which you are unaware.  Rather they are conscious thoughts that you have just 
thought at the same moment of coming to believe me as I make my assertion to you.   
By contrast with the principle that belief per se collects over conjunction, the 
principle that conscious belief collects over conjunction: 
If you consciously believe that p at t1 and consciously believe that q at t1 then you  
consciously believe that both p and q at t1 
 
is highly plausible32.  If you hold the belief that today is hot as well as the belief that 
today is humid and become aware of both beliefs then surely you not only believe that 
today is hot and humid but are also aware of that belief.  It now follows that you now 
consciously believe that I both do and don’t believe that p. 
Since you would be deeply irrational in consciously believing a self-contradiction, 
I am in a position to see, when I make the assertion to you, that you won’t believe me 
unless you are deeply irrational.  Since I should be charitable enough to try to avoid 
judging you irrational when I attempt to communicate with you, I should see that you 
couldn’t believe me. 
A parallel line of reasoning applies to the comissive case.  Suppose that you come 
to believe me when I assert to you that (p and I believe that not-p).  This means that you 
now believe me to be sincerely telling the truth.  So you must now think that I believe 
that p (in virtue of now thinking me to be sincere) and you must now, in the same instant, 
believe that I believe that not-p (in virtue of now thinking me to be telling the truth).  
Since these two beliefs you have just acquired are conscious thoughts and since 
conscious beliefs held at the same instant collect over conjunction, you now consciously 
believe that I hold contradictory beliefs about whether p. 
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 Since this is in effect a judgment that I am irrational, I am in position to see, when 
I make the assertion to you, that you won’t believe me unless you judge me irrational.  
And since I should see that you would be charitable enough to try to avoid judging me 
irrational when I attempt to communicate with you, I should again see that you couldn’t 
believe me.  So in either case I should recognise that that you cannot believe me unless 
you are theoretically irrational or judge me to be so.  Accordingly I should revise my 
plans.  If I don’t then I’m practically irrational.   
This account complies with Shoemaker’s constraint in two ways.  Firstly, if I 
believe my own words as I assert them to you then surely I must believe them 
consciously.  So what you must believe if you are to believe me when I make a Moorean 
assertion is identical to what is true if I truly believe my own words. Secondly, since part 
of my aim in making a Moorean assertion is to convince you of my sincerity, in making a 
Moorean assertion I aim to get you to attribute a Moorean belief to me.  Since I am in a 
position to see that this is a license to judge me theoretically irrational, one you will 
withhold rather than think I’m joking, I should realise on minimal reflection that the point 
of my assertion will not succeed. 
Finally, the whole account is maximally economical.  In explaining the absurdity 
of Moorean belief it requires only the principle that belief distributes over conjunction, 
plus Brentano’s principle of conscious belief.  In explaining the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion it requires only the principle that conscious belief collects over conjunction, 
together with the fact that the central aim of any assertor is to make one’s hearer think 
one a sincere truth-teller. 
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 Notes 
1. In parsing your “Either it is not raining or he believes that it is raining” as “If it is 
raining then he believes that it is raining” I take ‘if’ as implication.  Although 
such an inference is generally invalid, most would allow it here.  For example, 
Stalnaker 1975 and 1984 would allow it on pragmatic grounds because you don’t 
know which disjunct is true. If we symbolise ‘I believe that p’ as ‘Bp’ we have 
the following proof: 
 
1. ~(p & ~Bp)  Suppose the falsehood of Moorean assertion 
2. ~p v ~~Bp  De Morgan’s Law 
3. ~p v Bp  ~~ elim 
4. p → Bp  → equivalence 
 
2. Sorensen 1988 (Chapter 3, pp.16-56) is probably the first commentator to 
consider the nature of Moorean belief.  Until then only the absurdity of Moorean 
assertion was considered, initially as a pragmatic paradox in speech acts.  Since 
then xxxx 1994, 1996 1998, Baldwin 1990, Heal 1994, Rosenthal 1995a, 1995b 
and Shoemaker 1995 have discussed it. 
 
3. For a recent survey of the literature since Moore, see xxxx, Chapter 1 eds. xxxxx 
and xxxx. 
 
4. Sorensen (1988 p.39) first attempts this strategy by simply observing that a 
Moorean assertor appears to be a Moorean believer.  But this calls for an 
explanation of why appearing to hold such an absurd belief makes one absurd. 
 
5. This constraint is anticipated in Wolgast (1977, p.118). 
 
6. In contradiction of Rosenthal’s claim that “Moore’s paradox occurs with 
sentences… which are self-defeating in away that prevents one from making an 
assertion with them”. (2002, p.167). 
 
7. Sorensen coins these useful terms in (1988, p.16). 
 
8. This difference in formalism is disguised by Moore’s examples.  This is one 
reason to think that Moore himself did not see the difference.  If we formalise “I 
went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” as “p & ~Bp” then 
“I believe that he has gone out, but he has not” becomes “Bp & ~p”. By 
commutation this yields “~p & Bp”.  To achieve canonical reference to belief this 
may be represented as “p & B~p”.  
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 9. If a lack of belief that p entailed a belief that not-p then agnosticism would be 
impossible: 
 
1. ~Bp → B~p  Suppose. 
2. ~Bp & ~B~p  Suppose agnosticism. 
3. ~Bp   2, &-elim 
4. B~p   3, 1. 
5. ~B~p   2, &-elim 
  6. B~p & ~B~p  4,5, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
 
 And the converse entailment would prohibit contradictory beliefs: 
 
1. B~p → ~Bp  Suppose 
2. Bp & B~p  Suppose contradictory beliefs 
3. Bp   2, &-elim 
4. B~p   2, &-elim 
5. ~Bp   4, 1  
  6. Bp & ~Bp  4,5, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
 
10. This constraint on explanation is recognised by xxxx, De Almeida (2001, p.30) 
and Heal (1994, p.6).  Rosenthal’s diagnosis (2002, p.171) that a Moorean 
sentence denies the occurrence of the intentional state that it also purports to 
express, fails to explain the omissive assertion in which I deny nothing but rather 
affirm a belief.  By contrast Hájeck and Stoljar’s (2001, p.209) diagnosis of the 
absurdity of omissive Moorean assertion, that I express contradictory beliefs 
(because I assert that p and so express a belief that p and also assert that I believe 
that not-p and so express a belief that not-p) does not apply to the comissive 
version. 
 
11. See xxxx and Sorensen 1988 Chapter 1. 
 
12.  Including Hintikka (1962, p.67), xxxx, xxxx, xxxx, xxxx, Heal (1994, pp.21-22) 
and Sorensen (1988, pp.40-42 and 2000 p.42). 
 
13. Given  
 
B-elim) BBp → Bp 
B-&)  B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 
1. B(p & B~p)  Suppose omissive belief  
2. Bp & BB~p  1, B& 
3. BB~p   2, &-elim 
4. B~p   3, B-elim 
5. Bp   2, B& 
6. Bp & B~p  4,5, &-intro.  Contradiction. 
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 See xxxxx for a fuller discussion of Heal’s approach. 
 
14. Given  
 
B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 
1. (p & ~Bp) & B(p & ~Bp).  Suppose true omissive belief 
2. p & ~Bp    1, &-elim 
3. ~Bp     2, &-elim 
4. B(p & ~Bp)    1, &-elim 
5. Bp     4, B-& 
  6. Bp & ~Bp    3, 5, &-intro 
 
15. Given  
 
B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 
1. (p & B~p) & B(p & B~p)  Suppose true comissive belief 
2 p & B~p     1, &-elim 
3. ~Bp     2, &-elim 
4. B(p & B~p)    1, &-elim 
5. Bp     4, B-& 
  6. Bp & B~p    3, 5, &-intro 
 
16. As De Almeida (2001, p.42) notes, I need the minimal intelligence to present  
myself with such an argument for the absurdity.  This hardly constitutes an 
objection. 
 
17.Against De Almeida (2001, pp.42-43), my original diagnosis does not predict  
that my belief that  
 
I have at least one false belief  
 
is Moorean, despite the fact that such a belief means that I have inconsistent 
beliefs in the sense that they cannot all be true.  For since belief fails to collect 
over conjunction, I may hold inconsistent beliefs, as when I believe that p and 
believe that q and believe that not- (p and q), without holding contradictory 
beliefs. Evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not count 
against any of my other beliefs, nor visa versa. My correct belief in my occasional 
mistakenness does not entail beliefs that contradict each other, since we may 
consistently suppose that I don’t believe that all of my beliefs are true. See xxxxx 
for further discussion of this point. 
 
18. Similarly, when presented with the inscription, 
 
  1 + 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1+ 1 + 1 is greater than 1 + 1 +1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1  
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I can sincerely and truly assert, “That’s true” without having the thought that 10 is 
greater than 7.  What I correctly believe is that the inscription says something 
true, in virtue of correctly believing that the number denoted by the left-hand side 
is greater than that denoted by the right-hand side. 
 
19. Kant (A362-3) tried to capture this feature when he wrote that every conscious  
thought has an “I think” attached to it, which “accompanies… all representations 
at all times in my consciousness” William James (1892, p.42) observed that 
“Whatever I may be thinking of, I am always at the same time more or less aware 
of myself, of my personal existence”. 
 
20. Including Rey 1988, Aquila 1990, Dretske 1993, Goldman 1993, Natsoulas 1993,  
Block 1995, Stubenberg 1996, Byrne 1997, Carruthers 2000, Moran 2001, and 
Kriegel 2002, 2003a, 2003b. 
 
21. Given  
 
 B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 RP) Bcp → Bp & BBp 
 BB-&) BB(p & q) → BBp & BBq  
 
 1. B(p & ~Bp)    Suppose 
 2. B(p & ~Bp) & BB(p & ~Bp)  1, RP 
 3. BB(p & ~Bp)    2, &-elim 
 4. BBp & BB~Bp   3, BB-& 
 5. BBp     4, &-elim 
 6. Bp & B~Bp    1, B-& 
 7. B~Bp     4, &-elim 
 8. BBp & B~Bp    5, 7, &-intro 
 
22. Given  
 
 B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 RP) Bcp → Bp & BBp 
 BB-&) BB(p & q) → BBp & BBq 
 
 1. B(p & B~p)    Suppose 
 2. B(p & B~p) & BB(p & B~p)  1, RP 
 3. BB(p & B~p)    2, &-elim 
 4. BBp & BBB~p   3, BB-& 
 5. BBp     4, &-elim 
 6. Bp & BB~p    1, B-& 
 7. BB~p     4, &-elim 
 8. BBp & BB~p    5, 7, &-intro 
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 23. Given 
 
 RP) Bcp → Bp & BBp 
 Bc-&) Bc(p & q) → Bcp & Bcq 
 
 1. Bc(p & ~Bp)    Suppose 
 2. Bcp & Bc~Bp    1, Bc-& 
 3. Bcp      2,&-elim 
 4. Bp & BBp     3, RP 
 5. BBp      4, &-elim 
 6. Bc~Bp     2, &-elim 
 7. BBp  & . Bc~Bp    5,6,&-intro 
 
24. Given 
 
 RP) Bcp → Bp & BBp 
 Bc-&) Bc(p & q) → Bcp & Bcq 
 
 1. Bc(p & B~p)    Suppose 
 2. Bcp & BcB~p    1, Bc-& 
 3. Bcp      2,&-elim 
 4. Bp & BBp     3, RP 
 5. BBp      4, &-elim 
 6. BcB~p     2, &-elim 
 7. BBp  & BcB~p    5,6,&-intro 
 
25. Given 
 
 B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 
1. Bcp  ↔  B(p & Bp)  Suppose Brenanto’s Principle 
2. Bcp    Suppose 
3. B(p & Bp)   1, 2, MP 
4. Bp & BBp   3, B-& 
5. Bcp  → (Bp & BBp) 2, 4, CP 
 
26. Given 
 
BP) Bcp  ↔  B(p & Bp)  
  
1. Bc(p & ~Bp)   Suppose conscious omissive belief 
2. B[(p & ~Bp) & B(p & ~Bp)]  1, 2, substitution. 
 
 Given 
 
 B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
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1. (p & ~Bp) & B(p & ~Bp)  Suppose  
2. p & ~Bp    1, &-elim 
3. ~Bp     2, &-elim 
4. B(p & ~Bp)    1, &-elim 
5. Bp     4, B-& 
 6. Bp & ~Bp    3, 5, &-intro 
 
27. Given 
 
BP) Bcp  ↔  B(p & Bp)  
  
1. Bc(p & B~p)   Suppose conscious comissive belief 
2. B[(p & B~p) & B(p & B~p)]  1, 2, substitution. 
 
Given  
 
 B-&) B(p & q) → Bp & Bq 
 
1. (p & B~p) & B(p & B~p).  Suppose 
2. p & B~p    1, &-elim 
3. B~p     2, &-elim 
4. B(p & B~p)    1, &-elim 
5. Bp     4, B-& 
 6. Bp & B~p    3, 5, &-intro 
 
28. Against accounts that assign the same functional role to Bp as to BBp. 
 
29. One exception to this is when I say something to you merely in order to ‘wind you  
up.’ For example, suppose that I know that you think highly of Bush’s 
intelligence, an opinion I in fact share. Nonetheless I insincerely state that Bush is 
a moron in order to ‘rattle your cage’.  Here my intention is not to get you to 
believe my words by accepting my sincerity but rather to ensure you remain 
verbally opposed to my words by accepting my sincerity.  Another exception 
occurs when I make a ‘Tom Sawyer’ assertion to you.  For example, on learning 
that you have just discovered that I am a habitual liar, I decide to tell you the truth 
for once.  So when you ask me if the pubs are still open, I tell you the truth that 
they are still open in order to deceive you into mistakenly thinking that they are 
not.  In both cases I aim to make you think that my words are false.  When my 
assertion is Moorean, the first case is harmless because I can hardly hope to 
prolong verbal disagreement with you unless you think (mistakenly) that I’m 
sincere. But I am in position to see that you couldn’t take me to hold a Moorean 
belief unless you thought I was irrational. The Tom Sawyer example is likewise 
harmless because my intention to get you to mistakenly believe that my words are 
false means that I believe that my own words are true.  But when my assertion is 
Moorean I cannot rationally believe my own words. 
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30. In this respect my account is unlike Grice’s despite the fact that it involves the  
 intention to be thought sincere. 
 
31. If I were a parrot who uttered, “I can fly” you could hardly believe me, as opposed 
to my mere words.  
 
32. No worries about fat conjunctions need assail us, since very few of my beliefs are  
      simultaneously conscious to me. 
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